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Abstract
We examine the effect of electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) on
social welfare, in the framework of conventional spatial competition
models. We consider the case where both conventional and electronic
retailers coexist in equilibrium. We show that e-commerce does not
necessarily increase social welfare in the long run. In particular, when
electronic retailers have clear cost advantage over conventional retailers,
then the advent of e-commerce is shown to reduce social welfare.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the stock value of so-called B-to-C internet firms soared in the NAS-
DAQ market, electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) has attracted much at-
tention in terms of their potential to change century-old retailing of neigh-
borhood stores and large retail outlets. Although the subsequent burst of
these internet “bubbles” in the NASDAQ market somewhat lessens the pub-
lic interest in e-commerce, its impacts have been increasingly apparent in
everyday life of many countries fromN o r t hA m e r i c at oA s i aa n dE u r o p e .
Consumers are buying on line in increased numbers. The popular consen-
sus seems to emerge: e-commerce is considered to provide ideal transactions
in a “frictionless” market and to be desirable for our economy.1
To put this popular consensus in economic terms, Smith, Bailey, and
Brynjolfsson [2000] offer four dimensions to measure efficiency in elec-
tronic markets compared to conventional markets: price levels, price elastic-
ity, menu costs, and price dispersion. Then, they survey recent empirical
researches ( Bailey [1998], Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000], Goolsbee [2000]
etc.)2 and conclude that electronic markets are more efficient than con-
ventional markets with respect to price levels, price elasticity and menu
costs.3
However, lower prices, higher price elasticity and smaller menu costs
do not necessarily imply social welfare is higher. As welfare economics
teaches us, we should examine both sides of the market: retailers as well as
consumers to get a complete picture of the impact of e-commerce on social
welfare. Moreover, we should look at long-run consequence of e-commerce
after entry and exit of retailers under free entry. To do so, we need a
model where both electronic retailers and conventional retailers compete for
demand of consumers in a retail market. Unfortunately, to our knowledge,
there has been no such attempt to evaluate retail market equilibrium where
conventional and e-commerce retailers coexist.
The purpose of this paper is to construct such a model and then to
1See quotations in Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000], for example.
2See Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson [2000] for a complete list of research papers on
e-commerce. They also provide an annotated bibliography of selected papers.
3However, they report that price dispersion remains in electronic markets although price
information is considered to be disseminated smoothly in those markets. They offer vari-
ous hypotheses to explain it, such as product and retailer heterogeneity, convenience and
shopping experience.
2examine the impact of e-commerce on social welfare explicitly. To do this,
we choose the simplest and commonly-used model of spatial competition as
a starting point. Our model is a variant of Salop [1979]’s circular city
model with neighborhood stores.4 We call these stores as conventional
retailers. We incorporate into this framework electronic retailers powered
by Internet technology. We characterize e-retailing as having a large fixed
cost and a negligible menu cost. On the one hand, e-retailers have to
engage in extensive advertisement in order to obtain consumer recognition
and to build sophisticated distribution network to cater dispersedly-located
consumers. These costs are large and fixed in their nature. On the other
hand, e-retailers can adjust their prices more frequently and effectively than
conventional retailers, suggesting their menu costs are negligible.
The result is a striking one. In the conventional circular-city framework,
we show that if electronic commerce has clear cost advantage (i.e.,l o w e r
marginal cost) and that there are many conventional retailers before the
advent of e-commerce, then long-run equilibrium social welfare is unam-
biguously lower after e-commerce is introduced into the market. Although
it counters popular conviction, it has an intuitive reason. Cost advantage of
e-commerce implies many entries in the cybermarket, and this drives a large
number of conventional retailers out of markets. This means that consumers
who once patronized these neighborhood stores lose their favorite stores and
are forced to buy from Internet retailers. If there were many neighborhood
stores before, then consumers negatively affected by e-commerce outnumber
those who benefit from e-commerce (i.e., those who located far away from
neighborhood stores). Moreover, under free entry, Internet retailers’ profits
dissipate in the long run and thus there is no producer’s surplus. Thus,
only negative (distributional) effect on consumer’s surplus remains in the
market, making e-commerce welfare-reducing. Although the model of this
paper is only one of many possible models of e-commerce, the result of
this paper suggests that the present euphoria about e-commerce is somewhat
overdue.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we first explain a conventional circular-city model as a preliminary step,
and then consider features of e-commerce. In section 3, we incorporate
4A similar model is developed in Nishimura [1995] who incorporates large discount
stores located at the beltway just outside the circular city of conventional small neighbor-
hood stores.
3these features of e-commerce into the circular city model of Section 2 and
construct a model of coexisting e-commerce and conventional commerce. In
section 4, we characterize equilibrium. In section 5, we examine welfare
properties and present main results. Concluding remarks are given in Section
6.
2 The Circular City and e-Commerce
2.1 The Circular City Model
To examine the impact of e-commerce on the retail market, we begin with
the conventional circular city model of Salop [1979], which we briefly ex-
plain here for the sake of completeness.5 Consider a circular city of a unit
circumference, where households are distributed uniformly with unit den-
sity. Conventional retailers, which we hereafter call c-retailers, are located
equidistantly on the circle. Figure I depicts this market. In what follows,
we only consider symmetric equilibrium in which all retailers charge the
same price.
In the short-run, the number of c-r e t a i l e r si sf i x e da n de q u a lt on.T h u s ,
the distance between neighboring retailers is 1/n. Each household buys
at most one unit of a commodity (e.g. ab o o ko ram u s i cC D ) ,w h o s e
value is assumed to be v.6 If she buys the commodity at price p from
a c-retailer located at a distance x from her house, she obtains a benefit
v− p−cx,w h e r ec is a trip cost per distance.
A consumer located at a distance xi from c-retailer i posting price pi
is indifferent between purchasing from this c-retailer and a neighboring c-
retailer posting price p if v− pi−cxi = v− p−c[(1/n)−xi]. This implies a
demand at the ith c-retailer such that









, i = 1,2,..,n. (1)
Each c-retailer’s marginal cost of supplying one unit of the commodity is
assumed to be constant and equal to m. Each c-retailer maximizes its profit
(ignoring a fixed cost), (pi−m)di, by setting their price pi appropriately.
5See Salop [1979] and Tirole [1988, pp. 282–285] for details.
6We assume that v is sufficiently large so that each consumer buys one unit in equi-
librium.
4Thus, competition among c-retailers is Bertrand one with spatial product
differentiation.
We consider symmetric equilibrium where all c-retailers charge the same










In the long-run, free entry determines the number of c-retailers, n.7
There is a fixed cost f of operating in this retail market, so that the
long-run profit is Π S − f ,w h i c hm u s tb ez e r oi nt h el ong-run equilibrium.
For analytic simplicity, we treat the number of firms as a real number in







In order that this equilibrium number of st o r e si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ed e r i v a -
tion of demand function (1), we should have nS ≥ 2, since the derivation
assumes at least two stores are in the circular city. This condition is
satisfied if
c ≥ 4f. (4)
We assume (4) throughout this paper. Then, substitute (3) into (2), we




To distinguish the above variables with corresponding ones in our model
later, we added subscript S, which indicates “Salop”, to the former variables.
Finally, to clarify conditions about parameters in our main proposition,
we use the following long-run maximum trip cost in the circular city model:










7For analytic simplicity, we assume that c-retailers can relocate themselves equidistantly
with no cost.
52.2 e-Commerce
Let us now consider e-commerce. We hereafter call a retailer in the Internet
an e-retailer. In this paper, we are concerned with large-scale e-retailers
who command a substantial market share. We do not consider so-called
SOHO-type e-retailers, since their impact on conventional retailing is rather
insignificant. We focus on the following four characteristics of large-scale
e-commerce.
Firstly, the nature of consumers’ purchase cost in e-commerce is differ-
ent from that in conventional shopping. In the conventional retail market,
consumers visit a store in order to buy a product and return home with
the product. The trip cost depends on the location of consumers (distance
from the store), and thus it is heterogeneous as formulated in the circular
city model. In contrast, there is no physical store that consumers visit in
the e-retail market, so that there is no trip cost. Instead, consumers incur
delivery charges in order to get the product, but these costs usually do not
depend on their particular location in the city. Consumers also incur costs
to be connected to the Internet, and these costs also do not depend on
particular locations of consumers.8 Thus, the purchase cost in e-retailing
is homogeneous among consumers.
Secondly, an e-retailer incurs a substantial fixed cost just to make them-
selves known to potential consumers. While the presence of a store is ap-
parent in the local market, it is not in the cyberspace. To get consumers’
recognition and to induce consumers to visit their web site, e-retailers usu-
ally spend a considerable money in advertising in TVs, radios, and other
medias. This implies that the fixed cost that an e-retailer incurs to be
profitable in the cyberspace is not small, and may be substantially greater
than the fixed cost of a c-retailer.
Thirdly, consumers can get information quickly from the Internet. In
addition, e-retailers can change their price more flexibly due to small menu
costs.9 Therefore, once an e-retailer succeeds in getting consumers’ recog-
8Connection costs are negligible in the United States where unlimited services for local
calls are common. The costs are not negligible in other countries where metered services
are common.
9Bailey [1998, Table 5.8] finds that e-retailers change their price more frequently than
c-retailers in the U.S. markets for books, CDs and software. Moreover, Brynjolfsson and
Smith [2000] find that e-retailers’ price changes are up to 100 times smaller than the
smallest price changes made by c-retailers in the markets for books and CDs. These
findings indicate that menu costs that e-retailers incur are smaller than those c-retailers do.
6nition, information about the e-retailer’s change in price is transmitted to
potential customers much faster than that about the c-retailer’s, who wait
for consumers to pass by the store to see their window advertisement or to
read price advertisement in the next Sunday’s newspapers.
Fourthly, since e-retailers cater dispersedly-located consumer demand,
they have to establish an effective network of distribution and invento-
ries to respond consumer demand quickly and effectively. Thus, advanced
planning of their capacity to satisfy consumer demand becomes important.
Many episodes of stock-outs and failed delivery on time in Christmas sea-
sons in the United States in recent years highlight the importance of this
capacity consideration.
3 A Model of Local Retail Markets with e-Commerce
In this section, we incorporate the characteristics of e-retailers examined in
the previous section into the circular city model, then construct a model
where both e-retailers and c-retailers compete in a retail market simultane-
ously. Hereafter, ∗ denotes e-retailing. The n u m b e ro fc - r e t a i l e r si sn as
before and that of e-retailers is now n∗. In the short run, n and n∗ are
assumed to be fixed. In the long run, they are determined by free entry.10
The discussion in the previous section revealed two kinds of difference
between conventional retailing and e-retailing. On the one hand, price
information diffuses rather slowly in the conventional retailing, so that c-
retailers (that is, conventional retailers) have to advertise their prices in
advance, while e-retailers can change their prices rather easily to adjust
them to current market conditions. On the other hand, e-retailers catering
a large market area have to plan well in advance how much and where
they stock their merchandise in their local distribution centers. Thus,
as a stylized description, e-retailers first determine their quantity (stock of
merchandise) and then adjust their prices to sell them, while c-retailers first
determine their prices and to satisfy demand that these prices generate. In
other words, e-retailers compete with one another and with c-retailers in a
Cournot way,11 while c-retailers compete with one another and e-retailers
10Here we retain the assumption that c-retailers can relocate themselves equidistantly
with no cost.
11The result of Kreps and Scheinkman [1983] suggests that it is appropriate to assume
Cournot type quantity competition among e-retailers in our framework and even though
7in a Bertrand way. Consequently, we consider a one-shot game where
c-retailers use price and e-retailers use quantity (capacity) as their strategic
variables in the short run.
3.1 Demand Structure with e-Commerce
Let us first examine demand structure in the presence of e-retailers. We
assume that c-retailers locate equidistantly around the circular city as before,
w h i l ew ea s s u m et h a te - r e t a i l e r ss e tu p their web sites in the Internet which
are equally accessible to all consumers. As in Section 2, we consider
symmetric equilibrium, in which all c-retailers charge the same price and
all e-retailers supply the same quantity.
The Internet brings consumers an additional choice of shopping in the
cyberspace. That is, they can buy a product either from a conventional
market or from an electronic market. Figure II depicts the choice. On the
one hand, if she buys the product at price p from a c-retailer located at
ad i s t a n c ex from her, then she obtains a benefit v− p−cx,w h e r ec is
a trip cost per distance. On the other hand, if she buys it at price p∗
from an e-retailer12, then she obtains v− p∗ −c∗ where c∗ is a delivery
charge, which is the same for all consumers. We assume a competitive
transportation industry with constant marginal delivery cost c∗ a n dn of i x e d
cost. Then, the delivery charge is equal to the marginal cost of delivery,
as shown here.
We assume that consumers know all price in the market before deciding
a shop from which they buy the product. This assumption is justified
because they can know the prices of c-retailers and e-retailers quite easily
especially in the case of homogenous products such as books and music
CDs. In the case of c-retailers, they obtain price information, for example,
from c-retailers’ window advertisement when they pass by c-retailers’ store.
In the case of e-retailers, price information of a particular store can be
obtained almost instantly with a negligible additional cost if consumers
know that particular e-retailer.
A consumer located at a distance xi from c-retailer i posting price pi
is indifferent between purchasing from this retailer and purchasing from the
e-retailers have the flexibility to change their price, Bertrand-type price competition where
price equals marginal cost does not occur because of the capacity constraint.
12Note that we have assumed Cournot competition among e-retailers so that one price,
p∗, prevails in e-market.
8e-market if v−pi−cxi =v−p∗−c∗, or equivalently, xi =(1/c)(p∗+c∗− pi).
Thus, c-retailer i faces demand di such that
di = 2xi =
2
c
(p∗+c∗− pi), i = 1,2,..,n. (7)
for b p< pi < p∗+c∗ where b p is defined in Appendix A. Appendix A shows
that the optimal c-retailer’s price is in fact in this range in equilibrium. C-
retailer i maximizes its profit






with respect to pi, taking e-retailers’ price p∗ as given. From (8), it is
apparent that the c-retailer’s profit is a strongly concave function of pi.
The demand in the e-retailer submarket is the residual demand, so that










where p is the average price of c-retailers: p ≡ (1/n)∑n
i=1 pi. (9) is appro-
priate for p−c∗ < p∗ < p−c∗+ c
2n. It can be shown that p∗ is in fact in
this range in equilibrium (see Appendix A).
Since competition among e-retailers is Cournot one, it is convenient
to express the total demand of e-retailers (9) in the form of the inverse
demand function. Let d∗
j denote the quantity e-retailer j supplies. Then, the
total demand of e-retailers (9) in the form of the inverse demand function





where D∗ ≡ ∑
n∗
j=1d∗





















k, with respect to its quantity d∗
j taking other e-retailers’
quantity d∗
k : k 6= j and the average price of c-retailers p as given. It is
easy to show that (11) is a strongly concave function of d∗
j.
9Let us examine the difference between demand in the conventional mar-
ket without e-commerce (1) and that with e-commerce (7). The price
sensitivity of the demand (that is, the first-order derivative of the demand
with respect to its own price) is 1/c in the conventional market without
e-commerce (1), while it is 2/c in the market with e-commerce (7). Thus,
the presence of e-retailers increases price sensitivity of demand. Moreover,
price sensitivity of demand in the cyberspace (9) is 2n/c ,w h i c hi ss u b -
stantially higher than that in the conventional market. They are consistent
with recent empirical studies of e-commerce surveyed by Smith, Bailey and
Brynjolfsson [2000].
4 Equilibrium with e-Retailers
In this section, we first examine price and quantity in Nash equilibrium in
the short-run where both c-retailers and e-retailers coexist and their numbers
are fixed. Then, we investigate long-run equilibrium with free entry, espe-
cially equilibrium numbers of c-retailers and e-retailers, as well as long-run
equilibrium price and quantity. As in the circular city model of Section 2,
we treat n and n∗ as real numbers. However, again as in the circular city
model, we only consider cases in which n ≥ 1a n dn∗ ≥ 1i ne q u i l i b r i u m ,
since at least one store in the conventional market and one store in elec-
tronic market are assumed in the derivation of demand functions in Section
3. We examine conditions on parameterso ft h em o d e lt h a tg u a r a n t e et h e m .
In the following discussion, the following definition is shown to be
useful.
Definition 1 (Degree of Absolute Cost Advantage of e-Retailers)
z ≡ m−(m∗+c∗). (12)
Here m∗+c∗ is the sum of e-retailers’ marginal cost m∗ and the delivery
cost of e-retailing c∗, which is the social marginal cost of purchasing from
e-retailers (common to all consumers). In contrast, m is c-retailers’ marginal
cost, which the minimum social marginal cost of purchasing from c-retailers
since the trip cost cx is not included. To put it differently, m is the social
marginal cost of purchasing from c-retailers for consumers located just in
front of c-retailers’ store. Thus, the term z can be interpreted as a measure
of absolute cost advantage of e-retailers. If e-retailers are efficient in their
10procurement of merchandise, m∗ may substantially lower than m. However,
the delivery cost c∗ may be large to offset the e-retailers’ cost advantage.
Thus, z can be positive or negative depending on the relative size of the
marginal cost that two groups of retailers face, and the delivery cost.
4.1 Short-Run Equilibrium
In this market, c-retailers and e-retailers simultaneously choose their price
( i nt h ec a s eo fc - r e t a i l e r s )a n dt h e i rq uantity (capacity) (in the case of e-
retailers). C-retailer i maximizes (8) with respect to pi given p∗.F r o mt h e



















E-retailer j maximizes (11) with respect to its quantity d∗
j taking other
e-retailers’ quantity d∗
k :k 6= j and the average price of c-retailers p as given.













In this paper, as we mentioned before, we focus our attention on a
symmetric equilibrium where all c-retailers set the same price and all e-
retailers set the same quantity,
pi = p, i = 1,2,...,n,
d∗
j = d∗, j = 1,2,..,n∗.
Combining the conditons above with (13) and (14), we obtain equilibrium




















11In Appendix A, we show that all retailers have no incentive to deviate
from (15) or (16). Then, substituting (15) and (16) into (10), we obtain



















Since we are concerned with equilibrium where both c-retailers and e-
retailers are present: the price-cost margin of both c-retailers and retailers
should be positive and at the same time the demand at their (physical or
virtual) stores should be positive. From (15)-(18), both requirements are







are satisfied. In the next section, we examine conditions on parameters
(m,m∗,c,c∗, f , f ∗) that guarantee that this is the case in long-run equilib-
rium.
4.2 Long-Run Equilibrium
Let us now examine long-run equilibrium with free entry. Substituting (15),
(16) and (17) into (8) and (11), we obtain the equilibrium gross profits
























In the long-run equilibrium, the number of both types of retailers is deter-
mined by zero-profit conditions, that is,
Π (n,n∗)=f, (22)
Π ∗(n,n∗)=f ∗. (23)
12From (22) and (23), we obtain the equilibrium number of c-retailers and

















From (24) and (25), we find that n is small and n∗ is large when f ∗ is
small, while n is large and n∗ is small when f is small as expected.
Next, we consider long-run equilibrium prices and quantities. Substitute























Equilibrium prices and quantities (26) through (29) reveal that the fixed
cost of the e-retailer f ∗ has the effect only on the demand of the e-retailer,
d∗
long−run. As expected, when f ∗ is large, the number of entering e-retailers
is small and, as a result, d∗
long−run is large. However, the total demand in
e-market becomes small when f ∗ is large since it holds that
D∗







from (25) and (29).
As for plong−run and p∗
long−run,a ni n c r e a s ei nf ∗ has two effects; one
through a decrease in n∗, the other through an increase in n.T h ef o r m e r
raises these prices, while the latter decreases them under (19). (See (15)
and (17).) However, since these two effects are just canceled out in our
model, these prices are not influenced by changes in f ∗.13






the long run equilibrium, demand for each c-retailer, dlong−run, are not affected by changes
in f ∗ in the long-run.
13We are concerned with the coexistence equilibrium, that is, long-run
equilibrium in which both c-retailers and e-retailers coexist. In the coex-
istence equilibrium, we have n ≥ 1a n dn∗ ≥ 1, price-cost margins should
be positive for both retailers, and demand at both (physical or virtual)
stores should be positive. If model parameters (m,m∗,c,c∗, f, f ∗) satisfy

























Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, c-retailers and e-retailers coex-
ist in long-run equilibrium (n ≥ 1 and n∗ ≥ 1 ).
Proof. From (26)-(29), it is immediate to see that if the left-hand-side
inequality of Assumption 1 is satisfied then price-cost margins are positive
and demand is positive.14 It is apparent from (24) and (25) that the
left-hand-side inequality of Assumption 2 guarantees that n ≥ 1, while the
right-hand-side inequality implies that n∗ ≥ 1. It is also immediate to see
that the right-hand-side inequality of Assumption 1 implies c > 3
√
2cf+2z,
which is needed for Assumption 2 to be meaningful. Q.E.D.
Let us now compare equilibrium prices between equilibrium without e-
retailers (5) and with e-retailers (26) and (27). We immediately get








Thus, c-retailers’ prices are lower in equilibrium with e-retailers than without
e-retailers. However, e-retailers’ equilibrium prices may be greater or smaller
than equilibrium prices without e-retailers, since we have
p∗












/2. Thus, there exists z satisfying Assumption 1.
14Thus, if the delivery cost c∗ in e-commerce is sufficiently large compared
with the trip cost c of conventional retailing and the conventional retailers’
fixed cost f , equilibrium e-retailers’ price is lower than the equilibrium
prices without e-retailers, and vice versa. Thus, there is no ap r i o r ireason
that suggests e-retailers prices are always lower than equilibrium prices
without e-commerce.
A recent empirical study by Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000] shows prices
in the Internet tend to be lower than conventional retail markets. However,
at the same time, many e-retailers are not able to earn positive profits, and
their long-run survival comes under question. Thus, the their results are
not likely to be a good description of long-run equilibrium, but rather a
snap shot of transition to long-run equilibrium. There is no ap r i o r ireason
to assume that prices are lower in the cyberspace, especially if competition
among e-retailers is Cournot one based quantity (capacity) competition as
a s s u m e di nt h i ss t u d y .
5 Welfare Properties of Equilibria
In this section, we examine resource allocation of our retail market with
e-commerce. First, we compare social welfare between equilibrium with
e-retailers (Section 4) and without e-retailers (Section 2). Next, we com-
pare the equilibrium allocation to the optimum allocation where a planner
maximizes social welfare, then detect inefficiencies in market equilibrium.
5.1 Market Equilibrium with and without e-Retailers
As a measure of social welfare, we adopt the total surplus, that is, the sum
of consumer’s and producer’s surpluses. Firstly, the total surplus in market









where nS is the long-run number of c-retailers (3). Secondly, the total


















where the term in the first brackets is the total surplus of n c-retailers and
consumers who buy from c-retailers, while that in the second brackets is
the total surplus of n∗ e-retailers and consumers who buy from e-retailers.
The term x in (32) is the equilibrium border satisfying plong−run +cx =
p∗
long−run+c∗.T h a t i s , x is the distance between the marginal consumer
(indifferent between buying from a c-retailer and from an e-retailer) and the

















































From the above equation, we immediately get the following proposition.












then e-commerce reduces social welfare. That is, equilibrium social welfare





. If otherwise, e-commerce increases social welfare.
16This proposition shows that, if the fixed cost of e-retailers is sufficiently
small to satisfy (37), then social welfare is lower in equilibrium with e-
retailers than without e-retailers. Thu s ,i ti sn o ta l w a y st r u et h a tt h ea d v e n t
of e-commerce increases social welfare.
Although this proposition is simple, it is rather cumbersome to determine
whether a particular set of parameters (m,m∗,c,c∗, f, f ∗) satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2 and the condition (37). The following corollary of the
proposition presents an easy procedure to determine whether the advent of
e-commerce increases social welfare or not. The proof of this corollary is
delegated to Appendix C.
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, two market equilibria have the
following welfare characteristics.
1. Suppose that the equilibrium number of retailers when there is no
























Then we have two cases.
(a) Suppose that absolute cost advantage of e-retailers, z (see (12)),












is satisfied (where b cx is defined in (6)). Then e-commerce reduces





17(b) Suppose the contrary that absolute cost advantage of e-retailers











2cf ≈− 1.2b cx
is satisfied. This case is divided into two sub-cases.
































Of particular interest is the case that e-retailers have absolute cost ad-
vantage, that is, m∗+c∗ < m, or equivalently, z > 0. In this case, we have
the following Corollary from (2.a) of the above Corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then if e-retailers
have absolute cost advantage ( z > 0), then equilibrium social welfare with





That is, e-commerce REDUCES social welfare if e-retailers have absolute
cost advantage.
Corollary 2 is a striking result.15 It often takes it granted that if entrants
have clear cost advantage over incumbents, then entry of them increases
social welfare. Corollary 2 shows that it is not always the case, especially
in the case of e-commerce. In what follows, we investigate what makes
e-commerce reduce social welfare.
15For the coexistence equilibrium to hold under z > 0, the right-hand-side in Assumption
1 must be positive. This is true if we have c > 18f.
18First, note that retailers’ profits are zero in the long run for both c- and
e-retailers under free entry. Consequently, the effect of cost advantage of
e-retailers dissipates in the long run through an increase in e-retailers. Only





denote consumer’s surplus in equilibrium with e-retailers and
































From (5) and (26), we have








Thus, consumers located close to c-retailers benefit from entry of e-retailers,
so long as these c-retailers stay in the market. Moreover, from (3), (5)




















This means that consumers located far away from c-retailers also benefit













Thus, consumers lose substantially if they were located close to c-retailers
whom e-retailers drive out of the market.
From the above arguments we find that there are three types of con-
sumers who are differentially affected by e-commerce. If there are many
consumers of the first and the second types compared to those of the third
type, namely the effects through falling price dominate the effect through
exit of some c-retailers, then e-commerce enhances social welfare in to-
tal. However, if there are many consumers of the third type, those whose
19neighborhood stores are driven out of the market, then social welfare is
likely to be reduced.
In the short-run where the number of conventional retailers is fixed,
cost advantage of entering e-retailers may contribute to the total surplus
by increasing e-retailers’ profits, although it reduces existing conventional
retailers’ profits. However, in the long run, some conventional retailers
have to exit from the market because of competitive pressure while other
e-retailers enter the market to push down e-retailers’ profits to zero. Con-
sequently, the direct cost-advantage effect on profits dissipates and only an
indirect effect remains on the consumer’s surplus through the change in
the number of conventional retailers. If consumers negatively affected by
e-commerce through exit of their neighborhood stores outnumber those ben-
efited from falling c-retailers’ price, e-commerce has a negative impact on
social welfare.
5.2 Market Equilibrium and Command Optimum
To investigate inefficiencies in market equilibrium, let us consider a com-
mand economy where a planner controls the number and the market area
of both types of retailers to maximize the total surplus. We focus on a
symmetric policy under which the planner locates c-retailers equidistantly





























where consumers located within distance y from c-retailers are ordered to
buy from these c-retailers, and other consumers are ordered to buy from
e-retailers. (That is, 2y corresponds to a c-retailer’s market area.) The
planner maximizes (38) with respect to y, n and n∗ subject to the following
constraints:
0 ≤ y ≤
1
2n
, n ≥ 0, n∗ ≥ 0.
20We assume that the planner solves the above maximization problem in the
following sequence: firstly, it maximizes (38) with respect to n and n∗,
and secondly it does with respect to y given n and n∗.T h ef o r m e ri st h e
maximization of social welfare in the long run, while the latter is that in
the short run.
Let us first consider y. From (12) and (38), we obtain
TS= v−m+(1−2ny)z−ncy2−nf−n∗f ∗. (39)
Differentiating (39) with respect y,t h e nw ef i n dt h a t∂ TS/∂ y=−2n(z+cy).






2n, if z< − c
2n
−z
c, if − c
2n ≤ z < 0
0, if z≥ 0
. (40)
Next, we examine n and n∗, taking (40) into account. From (39) and
(40), we find that, when z ≥ 0,
TS= v−(m∗+c∗)−nf−n∗f ∗.
It is obvious that the optimum n and n∗ are such that n = 0a n dn∗ = 1
since an e-retailer’s cost is smaller than a c-retailer’s.16 Thus, all the market
is served by one e-retailer in the optimum.
In contrast, when z < 0, we have two cases. If −c/(2n) ≤ z < 0o r













Differentiating (41) with respect n,t h e nw ef i n dt h a t∂ TS/∂ n=(−z)2/c−
f . Thus, there are three cases: Case 1 ((−z)2/c> f ), Case 2 ((−z)2/c= f
)a n dC a s e3( (−z)2/c < f ). In Case 1, the total surplus increases as n∗
16Here we assume implicitly that f ∗ < v−(m∗+c∗) to assure that it is optimal to have
an e-retailer.
21decreases and n increases. Thus, the optimal n∗ =0. The planner’s problem
is reduced to the command optimum problem of the conventional circular









In Case 2, n does not affect social welfare. Thus, the optimal n is inde-
terminate, while the optimum n∗ is unity, since e-retailers have the same
constant marginal cost and a fixed cost. In Case 3, the total surplus in-
creases as n decreases. Thus, it is optimal to have n = 0a n dn∗ = 1.
T h u s ,w eh a v et h ef o l l owing proposition:
Proposition 3 T h e r ea r et h r e ec a s e s :
1. Suppose that z < −
√
cf. Then, it is optimal that all market areas are
served by c-retailers, and their optimum number is (1/2)
p
c/f.
2. Suppose that z = −
√
cf. Then, it is optimal to have one e-retailer
and c-retailers. The optimum number of c-retailers is indeterminate.
3. Suppose that z > −
√
cf. Then, it is optimal that all market areas are
served by one e-retailer.
Proposition 3 shows that coexistence of c-retailers with e-retailers in the
market is not optimal except for a knife-edge case of z = −
√
cf.17
Comparing market equilibrium in the previous section and the optimum
allocation in this section, we find two sources of inefficiency. First, there is
a classical over-entry inefficiency. Private benefits of entry (the gross profit
of a retailer) deviates from its social benefits (increase in the total surplus).
Second, non-competitive behavior of e-retailers adds another inefficiency.
This can be explained easily by considering the case of e-retailers’ absolute
cost advantage (z > 0). Although it is optimal to have only one e-retailer,
both c-retailers and e-retailers coexist in market equilibrium. E-retailers with
17In Nishimura (1994), he shows that coexistence of different types of retailers is optimal.
This is because his model assumes that the fixed cost of neighborhood stores, which
corresponds to c-retailers in our model, is heterogeneous among neighborhood stores, while
we assume homogeneous fixed costs among c-retailers. His model also assumes no fixed
cost of a discount store which corresponds to an e-retailer in our model.
22cost advantage do not want to capture all market areas but rather allow c-
retailers operate in the market. This is because to serve only a part of
the market and to maintain large price-cost margin is more profitable than
to capture the whole market by narrowing price-cost margin. As a result,
conventional retailers with cost disadvantage can remain in the market in
market equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have constructed a simple model where both conventional
retailers and electronic retailers (“e-retailers”) compete in a retail market.
We have shown that e-commerce does not necessarily increase social wel-
fare in the long run under free entry. Indeed, it has revealed that in a
conventional model of spatial competition, if electronic retailers have ab-
solute cost advantage over conventional retailers, then e-commerce reduces,
rather than increases, social welfare in the long run.
The results of this paper have several empirical implications. First, in
order to examine whether e-commerce enhances social welfare, we should
not only investigate retail price data but also various “hidden costs of pur-
chase” such as trip costs in conventional retailing and Internet-connection
and delivery costs in e-commerce, as well as cost structures of e-retailers.
Second, the long-run consequence of e-commerce may be very different
from its short-run impact. Third, it is utmost important to examine whether
total demand increases when e-retailers appear. It should be noted that our
simple spatial competition model concerns only with the trade-diverting ef-
fect of new entry, and it does not consider possible demand-creation effects.
Thus, if e-commerce creates entirely new demand, then the conclusion of
this paper may be reversed and e-commerce is more likely to increase social
welfare.
Finally, we list some issues which we can not treat in this paper. First,
we assume implicitly that all household can purchase goods from e-retailers.
That is, we assume that they not only have personal computers or similar
tools that are connected to the Internet but also have their abilities to use
them when shopping in e-markets. However, this assumption is not satisfied
in reality. We should take into account the heterogeneity of household, or
in other words, digital divide. Second, the issue of digital divide is related
to the government’s infrastructure policy because the government can affect
23the number of retailers and welfare of household by accumulating various
public capital which reduces trip costs when households go shopping at con-
ventional retail outlets and/or communication costs when they go shopping
at electronic outlets. Incorporating these features to examine the optimal
government policy is an important research agenda of future research.
24Appendices
A Proof that (15) and (16) are equilibrium price
and quantity
In this appendix, we prove that (15) and (16) are equilibrium price and
quantity under (19). That is, we show that all retailers have no incentive
to deviate from (15) or (16).
(1) c-Retailers.
Let us consider c-retailer i examining whether its profit increases by
changing its own price given other c-retailers’ price, p, and e-retailers’
capacity, d∗. Obviously, there is no incentive to charge a higher price than
(15). In the following, we examine whether the c-retailer has incentive to
charge a lower price than (15).
By decreasing its price, c-retailer i can gain more and more customers










then there is no customer of e-retailers in its neighborhood. Substituting












When the c-retailer decreases its price further from b p, then it faces com-
petition with neighboring c-retailers. Thus, the demand is now the same as


















25then the demand discontinuously increases and it obtains the entire market














w h i c hi sl e s st h a nt h em a r g i n a lc o s t ,m, under (19). That is, to undercut
its own price to get the entire market area of a nearby c-retailer pushes its
profit to be negative. Thus, the c-retailer has no incentive to set its price
below p.
Therefore, what we have to examine is whether the c-retailer’s profit
is greater than the equilibrium profit when its price is sufficiently low so
that it faces competition with neighboring c-retailers, rather than e-retailers.























































as long as (19) holds. Thus, if the c-retailer decreases its price below b p,i t s
profit decreases. As a result, we find that each c-retailer has no incentive
to deviate from (15) given other retailers’ price and quantity.
(2) e-Retailers.
Let us consider e-retailer j examining whether its profit increases by
changing its own capacity given other e-retailers’ capacity, d∗,a n dc -
retailers’ price, p. Obviously, there is no incentive to decrease its capacity
smaller than (16). So we examine whether the e-retailer has incentive to
increase it.
By increasing its capacity and selling larger amount of goods, e-retailer
j can obtain more and more customers from other e-retailers and c-retailers.
As a result, from (10), price in e-market, p∗,f a l l s .
26Suppose that e-retailer j ’s capacity is b d∗ and a corresponding e-market
price b p∗ such that
p = b p∗+c∗. (A.6)
Then, from (10), (15) and (A.6), it holds that
b d∗+(n∗−1)d∗ = 1.
That is, there is no customer of c-retailers in our economy (except on sites
located by c-retailers). When the e-retailer increases its capacity beyond
b d∗, then it faces competition only with other e-retailers. However, it is
easily shown that increasing capacity beyond b d∗ simply results in lowering
p∗, and reducing the e-retailer’s profit. Thus, there is no incentive for each
e-retailer to increase its capacity larger than (16), given other retailers’ price
and quantity.
B Long Run Equilibrium
In this appendix, we derive the equilibrium number of both type retailers
from (22) and (23). The sequence of the entry does not affect the results.
For exposition, we assume that first c-retailers enter the market and next
e-retailers enter the market. Given n , the number of e-retailers which can














Substituting (B.1) into (20) and rearranging, we obtain









Taking (B.2) into consideration, each c-retailer decides whether it enters the
market. Thus, the number of c-retailers which can enter the market, n,i s




















C Proof of Corollary 1

















for notational simplicity. Then Assumption 2 is simply f ∗ ≤ f ∗ ≤ f ∗.
In addition, we define b f ∗ such that











Then Proposition 1 is that under Assumptions 1 and 2, if f ∗ < b f ∗ holds,























18Π (n) and f have an intersection as long as Assumption 1 holds.
28Note that from (C.2) and (C.3), we have


















Therefore, if the set of parameters satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, then
such f ∗ is always equal to or greater than c f ∗. Consequently, e-commerce










holds. Then we have f ∗ < c f ∗.
(a) From (C.1) and (C.3), we find that



































then we get f ∗ < c f ∗. Therefore, if the set of parameters satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2, then such f ∗ is always smaller than c f ∗. Consequently,























holds, we have f ∗ < c f ∗ so that e-commerce decreases social welfare for
such parameter sets. Otherwise, e-commerce increases social welfare.
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